Danilo B. Medeiros

This paper compares Brazil's (1987–1988) National Constituent Assembly and Chile's (2021–2022) Constitutional Convention to examine how partisanship and institutional design shape constitution-making outcomes. Brazil's party-based assembly, despite internal ideological heterogeneity, achieved an accepted constitution through structured negotiation and leadership mechanisms. Meanwhile, Chile's nonpartisan convention faced fragmentation among independent constituents, had limited coordination tools, and ultimately produced a draft rejected by referendum. Drawing on a qualitative comparative case approach, roll-call analysis, and matching techniques, we show that partisan infrastructure can mitigate negotiation challenges by fostering compromise. In contrast, nonpartisan assemblies may enhance inclusiveness but risk fragmentation and instability without robust coordination mechanisms that bridge internal divisions. These findings challenge the presumed superiority of nonpartisan conventions, demonstrating the importance of party-based institutional frameworks for managing collective action problems in constitution-making.

Contemporary Brazilian politics is frequently described as "polarized" by academics, journalists, commentators, and the general public. This term often implies a crisis and dysfunctionality, similar to descriptions of other democracies. But what exactly does political polarization entail? Is it occurring only among the electorate, or also within parties and among parliamentarians? How has this phenomenon developed in Brazil and other countries? This essay aims to answer these questions and contribute to the discussion about the interaction between the preferences and interests of representatives and those they represent. To this end, I provide an overview of the literature and present data specific to the Brazilian case. Finally, I discuss the possible impacts of polarization on the 2022 elections and the future of democracy.

This research note explores whether the government-opposition dimension that emerges from voting records of Brazilian legislatures also arises in legislative speechmaking. Since the earlier stages of the legislative process are innocuous to policy outcomes, party leaders would have fewer incentives to coerce their copartisans' behavior in speeches than in roll calls. To test this expectation, this study estimates Brazilian political parties' policy positions, relying on a sentiment analysis approach to classify 64,000 senators' speeches. The results suggest that the president and the party leadership exert significant influence not only over how legislators vote but also over how they speak. We speculate that these unforeseen findings are backed by the decisiveness of speeches in passing legislation, the importance leadership gives to party brand, and legislators' need to signal their positions to leaders and the government.

Why would incumbent politicians adopt the secret ballot when doing so weakens the advantages of incumbency? Why is the secret ballot considered a democratizing reform in some settings, whereas in others it is associated with democratic backsliding? We provide theory and empirics to address these questions. Our starting point is the observation that the secret ballot had two consequences. It reduced the capacity to monitor the vote, thereby dampening the efficacy of clientelism. Yet, depending on literacy and electoral rules, it could also narrow political participation. Recognizing this, we endogenize politicians' preferences over the secret ballot, concentrating on the role of their personal and constituency characteristics.